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Narrating Devolution: Politics and/as 
Scottish Fiction 
Scott Hames
University of Stirling, GB
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This article explores the tensions between the competing cultural and 
 political narratives of devolution, anchored around James Robertson’s state-
of-the-nation novel And the Land Lay Still (2010). The article emerges 
from the two-year research project ‘Narrating Scottish Devolution’, and 
includes excerpts from workshops held on this topic at the Stirling Centre 
for Scottish Studies, alongside archival work on the internal debates of 
the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1969–73). The article unpicks 
competing teleologies of government de-centralisation and the recovery 
of Scottish cultural agency, ending with a call to begin the thorny task of 
narrativising devolution in political and historical terms.
Keywords: Scottish Literature; Devolution; James Robertson; historical novel; 
UK politics 
It is 1983, shortly after Thatcher’s landslide re-election, and the Scottish Left have 
gathered to squabble and lick their wounds.
There was tension in the air: identity politics versus class consciousness. The 
one policy that offered some prospect of common ground, devolution, was 
once again being squeezed from all sides. Nobody loved it, and nobody had 
much of a good word to say for it. (Robertson 2010, 532) 
The quotation is from And the Land Lay Still, James Robertson’s panoramic novel 
of post-war Scotland, and probably the most ambitious historical fiction to emerge 
from Britain this century. Robertson’s task is to spread the paltry saga of Scottish 
devolution onto a vivid social canvas, stretching the narrow ‘common ground’ of 
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constitutional debate to the full dimensions of the modern nation. The resulting 
tome attempts to weave every corner, faction and identity of the country into an 
intelligible Story of Scotland, one that makes political and emotional sense of qui-
etly transformative times. This is a highly diffuse and murky tale, and Robertson’s 
task is made all the more difficult because he cannot count on his readership – even 
his Scottish readership – recognising the basic timeline and dramatis personae. The 
book employs several complex framing devices, but even the factual grist of the main 
narrative will seem obscure to readers unschooled in recent Scottish history. This 
makes a high degree of political exposition necessary, such that And the Land Lay 
Still often feels less like a novel ‘about’ history than one ‘doing’ history: producing as 
it goes the story it seems to be recounting. For the majority of the book Robertson 
is not dramatising or re-telling events already familiar to the reader, but introducing 
and explaining them for the first time. In this respect, the novel carries within itself 
the problem of national historical recovery it sets out to represent. It is a hugely 
informative and justly popular book, bringing the unloved and largely untold story 
of devolution to a much larger audience. But Robertson’s historical ambition has its 
novelistic trade-off, and the book’s on-the-fly explication requires that characters and 
happenings arrive oversaturated with representative significance. In one early scene, 
the central character could almost be speaking for a reader under-convinced by this 
approach, glancing at his surroundings and observing that he ‘had never come across 
such enthusiasm for political debate, especially when it revolved around questions of 
national identity and self-determination’ (Robertson 2010, 64).
This occasionally stilted inter-meshing of Scottish politics and fiction has 
much to do with our own historical moment. As several articles in this issue of 
C21 Literature suggest, recent Scottish fiction and its critical reception are strongly 
conditioned by ongoing constitutional debate (see Hames 2012, Hames 2013). In 
accounting for links between Scottish literary and political developments of the past 
few decades, the scholar – like the historical novelist – faces a range of interpretive 
challenges and ambiguities. But they also encounter an established literary-critical 
discourse tending to draw strong and clear connections across the same doubtful 
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terrain, lines guided by the paradigm of ‘cultural devolution’. This article condenses 
the findings of a two-year research project exploring the emergence and legacy of 
this paradigm.1 
‘If Scotland voted for political devolution in 1997’, argues Cairns Craig, 
it had much earlier declared cultural devolution, both in the radical voices 
of new Scottish writing – from James Kelman to Matthew Fitt, from Janice 
Galloway to Ali Smith – and in the rewriting of Scottish cultural history 
that produced, in the 1980s and 1990s, a new sense of the richness and the 
autonomy of Scotland’s past cultural achievements. (Craig 2003, 39) 
On the cover of a 1999 issue of Edinburgh Review, the novelist Duncan McLean 
declares ‘There’s been a parliament of novels for years. This parliament of politicians 
is years behind’. This narrative of antecedence is now a commonplace in Scottish 
literary criticism, though it is often unclear whether the primacy of culture is a 
 matter of causation, displacement or surrogacy – culture driving politics, culture 
instead of politics, or culture as politics. Drawing on interdisciplinary workshop 
events, archival research and interviews with writers, scholars and politicians, the 
‘Narrating  Scottish Devolution’ project examined the interplay between literary and 
constitutional debates (concerning representation, legitimacy, ‘identity’) since the 
late 1960s, and explored how Scottish devolution came to be managed and valorised 
as a cultural project. 
 1 The ‘Narrating Scottish Devolution: Literature, Politics and the Culturalist Paradigm’ workshop was 
supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant, and the work of several dozen 
contributors from a range of disciplines (2014–16). A podcast derived from workshop recordings 
and interviews (entitled ‘Nobody’s Dream: Stories of Scottish Devolution’) appeared on the  Guardian 
 website on 26 February 2016, and is now archived on the Stirling Centre for Scottish Studies blog: 
https://stirlingcentrescottishstudies.wordpress.com/2016/02/26/nobodys-dream-stories-of- 
scottishdevolution/. My thanks to all the participants and observers who took part; needless to say 
this article is a very brief and selective account of our discussions. 
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Competing Narratives 
There is no strong ideological pulse beating through devolution, no political 
 theology hovering above the pragmatic fudging of institutional reform. This makes 
the meaning of devolution both conveniently flexible and somewhat unstable, both 
as a policy and as an object of knowledge. Perhaps appropriately for an enterprise 
involving the deliberate erosion of central authority, devolution is always susceptible 
to being commandeered and re-defined, bent to stronger narrative impulses than 
those of its tinkering architects. 
One key factor motivating this study, and manifest throughout our  discussions, 
was the clear divergence of ‘cultural’ and social-scientific stories of devolution. 
For many literary critics, cultural devolution in the 1980s was the forerunner of 
 democratic renewal. In the words of Robert Crawford, ‘devolution and a reassertion of 
Scottish nationhood were imagined by poets and writers long before being enacted 
by politicians’ (Crawford 2000, 307). Political historians and sociologists tend to offer 
a different set of explanations, centred on electoral politics, economic factors and 
largely invisible processes of UK institutional reform (Bogdanor 2001, Mitchell 2012, 
Devine 2016). With few exceptions, the first school pays as little attention to the 
1973 Kilbrandon Report as the latter does to Alasdair Gray’s Lanark (1981). Perhaps 
appropriately, the first serious attempt to integrate these stories comes not from 
academic history but Robertson’s fact-soaked novel. 
But it is not only writers and literary critics who account for devolution in cultural 
terms. On being appointed the first culture minister of the new Scottish Executive in 
1999, Sam Galbraith – a Labour MSP and a confirmed Unionist – told Ian Brown and 
other senior Arts figures that ‘in his view, the artists had made  devolution possible’.2 
In this story there tends to be a clear separation, both temporal and structural, 
between the agency of ‘culture’ and the activities of political parties and wider ‘civic’ 
 2 My thanks to Ian Brown for corroborating this well-travelled anecdote. For further details see Brown 
2012 and Brown 2013. Brown adds ‘Worth noting here that the claim is made by two very experienced 
and hard-nosed politicos, not artists claiming to be unacknowledged legislators!’ 
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bodies such as the Scottish Constitutional Convention. The writers and artists acted 
first and ‘off their own bat’, it suggests, while the politicians played catch-up within 
their own perimeter. In fact, this separation is a bit of a mirage. Many of the priorities 
associated with ‘cultural devolution’ – including the recovery and institutional 
 recognition of Scottish national identity – were vitally present in the most dry and 
technocratic 1970s debates conducted within Whitehall. The bureaucrats devising 
various schemes for devolution clearly understood that the policy was driven by 
electoral expediency, but they were also highly curious – and concerned – about its 
‘cultural’ dimension and implications. 
Over-Determinations 
But let us begin in the province of literary history, where Cairns Craig is the key 
figure in the construction of the culturalist narrative. Alex Thomson traces the 
tendency to read ‘the political process of devolution as the manifestation of more 
profound upheavals at the level of national self-consciousness’ back to its earliest 
appearance in 
Craig’s foreword to the Determinations series he edited for Polygon: ‘the 1980s 
proved to be one of the most productive and creative decades in Scotland this 
century — as though the energy that had failed to be harnessed by the politi-
cians flowed into other channels’. The first three books of the Determinations 
series were published in 1989, making the foreword evidence of the cultural 
phenomenon on which it claims to reflect. (Thomson 2007) 
Whether circular or not, we should notice that the culturalist narrative includes 
ample room for historical contingency and the unexpected twist. In a 2014 essay 
Craig observes that ‘in 1990 no political party in Scotland was in favour of the 
Parliament that actually came into existence in 1999’ (Craig 2014, 1).3 
 3 This version of Craig’s essay is yet to be published; he kindly sent me a draft in the summer of 2014. 
The main thrust of his argument is repeated in the shorter piece Craig 2014a. 
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Despite, after the decisive referendum of 1997, the oft-quoted appeal to the 
fact that the parliament was the ‘settled will of the Scottish people’, there 
had been, in fact, no Scottish political consensus on devolution. It happened, 
if not quite by chance, then through a series of apparently accidental and 
certainly unpredictable intersections of trains of events running in often 
contradictory directions. (ibid.) 
We begin to sense the challenge of imposing a narrative teleology on these devel-
opments, key episodes having been driven (quite nakedly) by short-term electoral 
calculation. Thus, Craig argues, an historical account centred on political parties 
and positioning will take us only so far. After a précis of the Campaign for a  Scottish 
Assembly (from 1980) and its successor the Scottish Constitutional Convention 
(from 1989), and the emergence of a pro-devolution consensus in Scotland during 
the Major government, Craig draws a clear and even provocative conclusion: 
It was not politics that was the cause of this huge shift in public opinion and 
political intention: if it had been, the politicians in favour of a ‘yes’ vote [in 
the 1997 referendum on devolution] would not have waited so nervously for 
the outcome, fearful of a repeat of the inconclusive vote of 1979. Something 
more profound was the cause of the enormous shift in Scottish sentiment 
that brought about the devolved parliament between 1979 and 1997 and 
that cause, I want to suggest, was the transformation in Scotland’s national 
self-perception brought about by a profound reorientation in the value of its 
culture. Between 1979 and 1997 Scotland underwent a cultural revolution 
and it was that cultural revolution, rather than the decisions of the political 
parties, that was the effective cause of the political outcome in the 1997 
referendum. (Craig 2014, 5) 
This is the culturalist case at its strongest (perhaps slightly needled by  revisionist 
 commentary from critics including Alex Thomson and myself), and it features strongly 
in And the Land Lay Still. One passing irony is that ‘cultural revolution’ should figure 
as the inspiration of a reformist political project ‘of a strikingly conservative  character’, 
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in the words of Vernon Bogdanor, whose core purpose is to ‘renegotiate the terms of 
the Union so as to make them more palatable to Scottish opinion in the conditions 
of the late twentieth century’ (Bogdanor 2001, 119). But this is to view devolution 
from the centre, as an exercise in containment – even appeasement – rather than 
peripheral empowerment. Devolution looks very different viewed from Whitehall 
as compared to the literary pubs of Edinburgh, one key reason Scottish writers and 
cultural activists have been able to narrate the process in their own image, on terms 
that arguably inflate their political influence beyond the urban cognoscenti.4
Indeed, other scholarly voices point to Scotland’s effective disempowerment as 
devolution’s mobilizing leitmotif. Turning to the economic and political climate of 
Thatcherism, historian Catriona Macdonald is sceptical about the explanatory force 
of the culturalist paradigm. Interviewed at our 2015 workshop event, Macdonald 
insisted 
I would totally disagree with the idea that any artist – named, unnamed, 
or imaginary – generated what was necessary to ground the Scottish 
Parliament. I think if you ask a majority of Scots, that would not be some-
thing that they would remotely bring to the table. That’s not to say that 
art was not important, but it was not determining. The riches of cultural 
discussion and debate about that period are to be found in looking at 
how it nurtured or emphasised certain aspects of a cultural re-awakening 
that’s more broadly conceived. But far more profound was the economic  
dislocation of the previous twenty years. The post-Thatcher period in 
Scotland, a period when unemployment was skyrocketing, when former 
icons of Scotland’s proud industrial past were eroding, were getting closed 
down, when things we had told ourselves, about who we were as a nation, 
suddenly were counting for nowt when it came to the British state . . . the  
narrative of Empire, the narrative of the welfare state, the narrative  
of Scotland as part of a British settlement in which Scottishness was 
 4 Three key journals of this movement – Radical Scotland, Cencrastus and New Edinburgh Review – were 
published within yards of each other at the University of Edinburgh.
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valued – all of those things at once came into question. Did culture 
 determine that? No it didn’t; but cultural commentators, artists, movie-
makers, musicians, all had a part to play. (Recording, Workshop 2) 
But what part was that, and does it continue today? We return to the most prominent 
and successful effort to construct a literary narrative of devolution. 
And the Land Lay Still 
Robertson’s And the Land Lay Still is the most fully realised attempt to make a 
 cohesive national story of the period and forces of devolution. Having been  politically 
active in the 1980s, notably through the pro-devolution magazine Radical Scotland 
(1983–91) – thinly disguised in the novel as Root & Branch – Robertson naturally 
began with events and debates he had experienced first-hand. But on beginning to 
revisit this period he encountered a historical problem: 
What I found very quickly was that I couldn’t tell the story of the  devolution 
years, if you like – the period of 1979 to 97 – simply by locating the story 
in that period. What I had to do was go further back, and what I  eventually 
found was that I had to go right back to the 1950s, because the story I was 
trying to tell, and the story that I think is the story of how we got from 
where we were to where we are, is this contest between Scottishness and 
Britishness. It seems to me that 1950 [. . .] is when Scotland was most tied 
into the British project and to the British state [. . .] All of that begins to 
 disintegrate, for lots and lots of reasons, from the 1960s onwards. And 
because there is a modernised sense of Scottishness taking shape at the 
same time, that gives people somewhere to go when they can no longer 
feel at home within that sense of Britishness. And that’s what I was trying to 
capture in And the Land Lay Still, the narrative of which runs from 1950 to 
about 2008. (Recording, Workshop 1) 
The deep backstory here is suggestive, and matches the dominant strand of ‘cultural 
devolution’ focused on the retrieval and recovery of the Scottish past. To correlate 
the everyday lives of characters with key dates and events in the national story, 
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however, poses a great difficulty to the historical novelist. Robertson needs a cast 
of relatable characters whose emotional lives are deeply entwined with macro-
political  developments – developments not even his Scottish readers can be assumed 
to recognise. This necessitates occasional ‘info-dumping’ as one reviewer has it 
(White 2015), and an abundance of symbolic minor characters whose intimate lives 
are tightly yoked to political events: 
Sir Malcolm Eddelstane, after a prolonged argument with Lady Patricia, suc-
cumbed to her advice and stood down prior to the 1964 General Election. 
The Profumo affair, the general disarray of Macmillan’s government and a 
wider change of mood in the country, she said, signalled not only that the 
Conservatives were due for a spell in opposition but also that a more mod-
ern type of candidate would increasingly be required to counter the appeal 
of Labour. Sir Malcolm was only fifty-five, but looked much older, and was 
definitely on the traditional wing of the party. ‘Choose the time and manner 
of your departure,’ Lady Patricia said. (Robertson 2010, 426) 
The departure, here, is from the conventions of novelistic realism. We are very far 
from lived experience or natural speech, and encounter characters like the Eddels-
tanes largely as historical ciphers. Later an alcoholic ex-spy, whose career in the secu-
rity services involved infiltrating fringe ‘tartan terror’ groups of the 1970s, briskly 
telescopes developments from 1974–2007. There is little sense of human memory 
or recollection: 
When I think about it now it’s clear enough. Those months between the 
two General Elections that year [1974], that was when the whole direction 
of Scottish politics for the next three decades was laid down. The SNP won 
seven Westminster seats in the February poll and came second to Labour in 
thirty-four more. Bound to loosen the bowels a bit, eh, if you were a Labour 
MP? So the party machine clanked into reaction. Wilson told the Scottish 
leadership they were going to have go down the devolution road, like it or 
not, in order to shunt the Nats into the ditch. Result? Five years of bluster 
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and barter, a failed referendum, eighteen years of Tory rape and pillage, ten 
years of Labour-led devolution and, at the end-up, a Nationalist government 
in Edinburgh. (Robertson 2010, 319) 
These strained effects raise a second difficulty for the literary historian. A book highly 
prized by pro-independence readers and politicians (declared 2010 Book of the Year 
by several leading figures in the SNP Government, including Alex Salmond (Salmond 
2010)), is actually quite difficult to locate within the culturalist paradigm, in which 
literary nationalism operates as a form of devolutionary avant-garde. The literary 
chapter of that story tends to centre on the resurgence of authentic Scottish language 
and the realistic treatment of grim urban realities, often from a deeply subjectivised, 
alienated perspective in which the larger rhythms of the social body are scarcely 
audible.5 And the Land Lay Still has its share of introverts and traumatised loners, 
but its narrative architecture insists on the piecing together of personal scraps and 
fragments into the larger mosaic of a national story, one whose structural movements 
are defined by aggregative public events such as elections and referenda. In this 
narrative economy the significance of the personal experience or novelistic detail 
will derive ultimately from the connections drawn upward through them – connections 
revealed and determined by the over-arching totality of the national story. A key 
passage offers the following brisk synopsis of where devolution came from: 
Here is a situation: a country that is not fully a country, a nation that does 
not quite believe itself to be a nation, exists within, and as a small and  
distant part of, a greater state. The greater state was once a very great state, 
with its own empire. It is no longer great, but its leaders and many of its 
people like to believe it is. For the people of the less-than country, the not-
quite nation, there are competing, conflicting loyalties. They are confused. 
(Robertson 2010, 534) 
 5 E.g. Irvine Welsh, Trainspotting (London: Secker & Warburg, 1993), A.L. Kennedy, Looking for the Possible 
Dance (London: Secker & Warbug, 1993), James Kelman, How late it was, how late (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1994).
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They might be confused, in their personal fumblings and smallness, but even 
their bafflement is clear and orderly from up ‘here’, certainly when viewed on the 
national scale – one not quite visible or inhabitable down at ground level. Whereas 
Walter Scott’s historical fiction – the subject of Robertson’s PhD in History – was 
celebrated by Lukács for ‘portraying the totality of national life in its complex 
interaction between “above” and “below”’ (Lukács 1962, 49), in this novel the very 
reality of the nation is constituted by perspectives available only up ‘here’. Whereas 
in Scott (for Lukács) ‘“below” is seen as the material basis and artistic explanation 
for what  happens “above”’, in Robertson’s epic we find the reverse: a totalised (and, 
to be sure, socially ‘inclusive’) Story of Scotland effectively brings into being the 
national subjects whose doings and happenings fill in the gaps between crucial 
by-elections.
Reflecting in the novel’s closing lines on his own efforts to trace an artful 
 unifying thread through personal, sexual and political transformation, the  central 
character insists ‘the connections will be made, and he understands that it has 
fallen to him to make them’ (Robertson 2010, 671). But for all of the novel’s 
 preceding 670 pages the fully joined-up big picture is beyond the ken or 
 experience of individual characters, visible only to the talking-textbook narrator 
who  possesses ‘the situation’ in advance. As Robert Alan Jamieson observes in 
his review of the novel, its great slabs of historiography are ‘sometimes offered 
to the reader by an authoritative, noncharacterised voice which doesn’t appear 
to emanate from within the diegesis’ (Jamieson 2010) – a technique which 
reverses a key agenda of devolution-era Scottish writing, namely James Kelman’s 
crusade to abolish precisely this narrative stance and its bogus authority.6 Thus 
the  political novel which arguably crowns the ‘new renaissance’ in Scottish 
fiction – both documenting and embodying the story of how Scotland re-asserted 
its own narrative agency – is actually quite difficult to connect to its 1980s and 
1990s predecessors, certainly when we plot the development of contemporary 
 6 Needless to say, Kelman’s technique and rationale remains a key influence on Scottish writers includ-
ing Janice Galloway, Irvine Welsh, Alan Warner, Alan Bissett and Jenni Fagan.
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Scottish fiction on stylistic or aesthetic lines (see Hames 2016). It may be that 
the extraordinarily diffuse and over-determined story of devolution simply cannot 
be told in the intensely particularised narrative style usually held to characterise 
modern Scottish fiction’s coming to political voice. 
Devolution as British 
This being said, too fixed attention to the national story can obscure key aspects of 
devolution, which – as Robertson notes – has as much to do with Britishness as Scot-
tishness. At our first workshop, Catriona Macdonald noted that:
It was of course a British government that delivered devolution. And here 
we hit on the Scottish/UK interface that, I would suggest, usually takes a 
backseat when it comes to cultural analyses of 1997, which are often very 
Scotocentric. It was what Scottish voters had in common with voters across 
the UK that delivered regime change in 1997, not the differences. And it 
was this regime, based in Whitehall, led by a privileged Scot, that delivered 
the referendum – not poems in short-lived literary journals, not touring 
productions of low-budget angry plays, not folk laments. Identities defined 
in part by economics rather than nationality were mobilized in 1997 and 
arguably the rest came down to psephological aberrations that saw solid 
Tory seats go Labour for reasons that were far removed from the ideals of 
the Scottish literati. Indeed, one interpretation of the 1997 referendum was 
that it proved the Union was actually working. It was a very British solution 
to an acknowledged domestic problem that, I would say, Scottish Tories of 
the 1950s would have had very little difficulty in appreciating. After all, the 
levers of power were retained in Westminster and political power remained 
in the hands of the usual suspects. (Recording, Workshop 2) 
And yet, those Scottish Tories of the 1950s – whose party was still known as the 
Unionist Party – would have been horrified to think devolution could pave the way 
to Scottish independence. 
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Devolution’s Backstory: Managing ‘National Feeling’ 
If for Craig the ‘effective cause’ of devolution’s endorsement in 1997 was cultural 
 revolution, there is little doubt that the proximate cause was electoral. This part of the 
story is well-trodden ground, and vividly told in Robertson’s novel:  Winnie Ewing’s 
sensational victory for the SNP in the 1967 Hamilton by-election, and  growing alarm 
within the Labour government at the threat posed by the nationalists, rising sharply 
after the discovery of North Sea Oil in 1970. Both to allay and defer these pressures, 
Harold Wilson announced his intention to appoint a Royal Commission on the 
Constitution in late 1968. 
The idea behind this was to give the appearance of doing something, which 
would avoid the need for real action for as long as the commission was 
 deliberating. According to Wilson, the commission was designed to spend 
years taking minutes, but in public it gave the appearance that the govern-
ment was taking the issue seriously. It was hoped that, by the time the com-
mission reported, the SNP would have gone away. (Finlay 2004, 322)7 
Its findings, eventually published in the 1973 Kilbrandon Report, set the process of 
Scottish devolution into deliberately retarded motion. 
This part of the project draws on archival research into the Royal Commission 
and the ‘cultural’ dimension of devolution policy from 1967–1979. Competing 
narratives and histories – both of Britishness and Scottishness – are richly evident 
in unpublished drafts and discussions of the Royal Commission, as is a striking 
preoccupation with national feeling and sentiment. From an early stage of its 
 deliberations the Royal Commission comes to understand its primary purpose as 
that of remedying the threat posed by sub-British nationalism, and theorises the 
problem as one of affect and attachment: ‘the question for us is whether in [Scotland 
and Wales] the existence of national feeling gives rise to a need for change in political 
 7 Robertson’s detailed summary of the same developments in And the Land Lay Still extend across more 
than 60 pages, and are well worth consulting as an historical primer (Robertson 2010, 278–344). 
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institutions’ (Royal Commission 1973, I, 102). Indeed, an entire chapter of the final 
Report is devoted to the nature, strength and implications of ‘National Feeling’. The 
Commission is continually exercised by whether votes for the SNP reflect a desire for 
constitutional change, or mere recognition of distinct national identity. Devolution is 
thus conceived as the management of ‘national feeling’ and its channelling into new 
institutional loyalties which will corral its destabilising potential. One of Robertson’s 
fictional spymasters also conceives the threat of nationalism in emotional terms 
when justifying the intelligence services’ heightened interest in the SNP after 1967: 
‘people should be aware of the dangers, the unintended consequences, of indulging 
their emotions. They need to be made aware of them’ (Robertson 2010, 290). For all 
that, ‘the government’s policy is to contain Nationalism, not to persecute it’ (299), 
and the receptacle for this containment is ‘identity’ itself. The Kilbrandon Report 
recommends devolution as ‘an appropriate means of recognizing Scotland’s national 
identity and of giving expression to its national consciousness’ (Royal Commission 
1973, I, 335) but takes great pains to emphasise its larger purpose of strengthen-
ing and preserving Britishness. Notably, the discourse around ‘identity’ shifts into 
a more romantic idiom of national community when placing the essential unity of 
the United Kingdom beyond question. A section on ‘history and tradition’ declares: 
The geographical separation of the United Kingdom from the continental 
mainland and its achievement of world prominence as one people have had 
a strong unifying effect which we regard as irreversible. (Royal Commission 
1973, I, 122) 
In the White Paper which followed Kilbrandon in September 1974 the language of 
patrie, heritage and unity is likewise reserved for the defence of the UK state-nation. 
As the political space in which Robertson’s ‘modernised sense of Scottishness’ will 
gain institutional form begins to emerge, the prevailing vision of Britishnesss is 
jarringly antique. Instead of revising British identity alongside its constitutional 
framework, there is a strong sense of retrenchment as pro-devolution figures seek 
to dispel fears of diluting UK identity and power. With devolution only politically 
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saleable in England as a buttressing of British unity, sovereignty and greatness – the 
soothing mantra ‘power devolved is power retained’ is voiced in an unbroken 
line from Enoch Powell to Tony Blair – the political dynamic which accompanied 
 devolution has probably delayed the development of a post-imperial British culture.
Managing such worries took up a good deal of the Commission’s time. The min-
utes of a November 1972 meeting show the degree to which devising a coherent 
plan to recognise (and neuter) ‘national feeling’ involved extensive debate over how 
to accommodate cultural difference within the British national story: 
It was agreed that: – 
a) In the sections in Chapters 4 and 5 on the Scottish and Welsh peoples, 
more emphasis should be laid on the fact that the differences described 
were historical and had been narrowing over time. 
b) To achieve better balance, there should be more reference to the 
 common characteristics of the British people. . . (Royal Commission 
papers, National Archive, HO 221/360).
Eventually, it proved impossible to contain or accommodate the tensions  perceptible 
beneath this smooth bureaucratic summary. The Commission would later split, 
with a faction led by Norman Crowther-Hunt (later appointed Devolution Adviser 
to the Wilson government) dissociating itself from the main Report and authoring a 
separate Memorandum of Dissent. (Robertson’s spymaster quips ‘Makes you proud 
to be British, doesn’t it? . . .  Kick a ball into the long grass and when somebody finally 
goes to retrieve it they come back with three’ (Robertson 2010, 314)). The Dissenting 
report takes particular exception to the historical framing finessed above. 
The majority report, we believe, has the effect of magnifying the extent of 
the social and cultural differences between Scotland, Wales and England. 
This is partly because of the way it handles in the historical section the  
concept of ‘nationhood’ – with Scotland and Wales thus appearing as  separate 
nations with distinctive values and ways of life ‘struggling to be free’. In 
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 contrast there is no matching study of the more homogenous  contemporary 
pattern of social and cultural values and behaviour which characterise all 
the different parts of the United Kingdom. (Royal Commission 1973, II, vii) 
In this respect, devolution from its earliest formulation has centred on unresolved 
(and perhaps unresolvable) questions of British identity and ‘national feeling’. 
Recuperating Scottish History 
If contesting an integrated British historical narrative was key to these Whitehall 
debates of the 1970s, the question of Scotland’s ‘distinct values and way of life’ were 
being explored with great energy by writers and scholars. Here the problem was 
blank space, rather than competing stories. During our first workshop, Cairns Craig 
argued that the explosion of Scottish historical writing over the past few decades 
 represents the ‘filling-in of what was a kind of emptiness in the Scottish past’. For 
Craig the energies which led to Holyrood originate in the recovery of national his-
torical memory, with magazines such as Radical Scotland and Cencrastus playing a 
key role: 
You’ve now got an awareness of the Scottish past that was simply not 
 available to anyone in 1979. This, it seems to me, from my own experience, 
was a very deliberate political campaign, through culture, to transform the 
perceptions of Scottish people. The analysis which those of us involved in 
Cencrastus magazine made, in 1979, was that the Scottish people could not 
vote for their own parliament because they had no sense of their own history 
or their own culture, and they had no valuation of their own culture. [. . . ] 
What it seems to me we were doing was providing the cultural infrastructure 
which would make it possible for people to exert the will that would become 
settled, because they would actually have a background against which to see 
their own actions. (Recording, Workshop 1) 
As with Robertson’s novel, it falls to an historically conscious elite to endow the 
nation with a restored sense of cultural wholeness and self-respect. No agency 
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without identity: but for this prior step, the recovery of national democracy – also 
largely a top-down affair, affirming the generous flexibility of Whitehall – would be 
unintelligible even to newly empowered citizens.
Literary Nationalism and its Discontents 
Alongside the recovery and ‘filling-in’ of Scottish cultural identity were several 
literary interventions which urged caution about national tradition and pre-
given modes of belonging. At the 2014 workshop, critic Eleanor Bell surveyed 
small experimental magazines of the 1960s including New Saltire and  Scottish 
International. These magazines contain a range of cultural explorations 
which clearly anticipate the debates of the following decades, without being 
yoked to, or delimited by, the national question as a salient political issue 
(which was yet to fully emerge). Scottish International magazine (1968–74), for 
example, set its store on newness and exploration, not recovery of the past. In 
Bell’s words, 
Scottish International promoted itself as a magazine for the development of 
a radical critique of culture and society, experiment being very much at the 
heart of it. Just as Bob Tait was giving up the magazine he wrote that ‘basi-
cally I’ve seen this magazine as a kind of exploration vehicle, getting as far 
as possible into the depths, some of them murky, of the society and culture 
within viewing range.’ [. . . ] In tracing these magazines and debates, we can 
discern a fierce reaction to insularity at the start of the 1960s, but as we 
move through to Scottish International there’s still a very sceptical vision of 
cultural nationalism and the pitfalls of being too entrenched within certain 
forms of national identity. There’s a passionate focus on Scotland but also a 
deep suspicion of complacent ways of thinking about identity. (Recording, 
Workshop 1) 
Indeed, the rise of literary nationalism in journals such as Akros and Lines Review 
was occasionally queried from within its own precincts. In 1971 the English-born 
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Edinburgh poet Alan Jackson took aim at the SNP’s new cultural cachet in ‘The 
Knitted Claymore’, scolding 
people wishing to recreate a defunct historical form because they are so lim-
ited that they can’t relate to the world or apparently find meaning unless they 
consider themselves and are considered by others as Scots. It is a sad business 
that present Scottish nationalism is not just an affair of a few  hundred  pining 
descendants of Casimir Stuart or a handful of dream-crazy  monarchists.  
[. . . ] the concept of the sovereign state has led to the present hellish and 
self-destructive postures of ‘defence’ and continues the myths by which a 
few can act on behalf of many, tens of thousands of Scottish  nationalists 
and their sympathizers. Are we too to have our frontiers and passports,  
our own call-up papers and definition of undesirable aliens? A new form of 
loyalty and so a new form of surrender? (Jackson 1971, 7–8) 
Other voices rather welcomed the bracing effect of the call-up papers, or devolu-
tion’s nearest equivalent. Writing in the wake of the failed 1979 referendum on a 
Scottish Assembly, Tom Nairn took heart from the harsh division exposed between 
the ‘windy, sleekit, after-dinner “Patriotism”’ of middle-class Scotland and the hard 
political choice imposed by the Scotland Act. Despite the general malaise which 
followed, wrote Nairn, ‘a great deal of spineless self-affirmation was blown away in 
the result’. 
People were made to line up in some sort of vague battle-order, and Scotland 
was made to see more clearly that the growth of real national consciousness 
is a difficult conflict, a civil war within the nation as much as a struggle 
between it and the metropolis. (Nairn 1979, 8) 
The full rigours of a politicized assertion of Scottishness would have to wait for the 
debates of 2012–14, however. In 1983, Joyce McMillan felt that the ‘Predicament of the 
Scottish Writer’ – updated from Edwin Muir’s 1936 diagnosis in Scott and Scotland – 
was marked by an over-developed reflex of self-assertion, noting that the Scottish cul-
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tural establishment ‘cherishes its hard-won consciousness of the ways in which Scottish 
culture has been discriminated against, and tends to demand that that consciousness 
never be let slip; and it is at this point that the artistic rot set in’ (McMillan 1983, 69). 
Its ill-effects may be literary and aesthetic, but the remedy is clearly political: 
The destructive obsession with the need to emphasise and preserve the 
‘Scottishness’ of our writing far beyond what comes naturally and truthfully 
to writers will persist for as long as Scotland remains in a political limbo; in 
other words, it will last until Scotland either becomes a full nation-state, or 
loses its sense of nationhood altogether. (McMillan 1983, 70) 
Notice that the halfway-house of devolution does not figure here. Perhaps the 
extended hyper-awareness of Scottish difference and marginality comes with the 
raising, in devolution itself, of ‘political limbo’ to a ‘settled’ constitutional position. 
A fully mobilized kulturkampf was postponed for the debate on independence itself. 
2014 and all that 
With workshop events held just before, and roughly a year after, the referendum on 
Scottish independence, the urgency of these political questions was a strong pres-
ence in our discussions. It was in this light that Italian critic Carla Sassi offered an 
‘outsider’s perspective’ suggesting we think twice before discounting the force of 
literary nationalism:
In Scotland, as much as in England – I don’t see much difference here – 
literature has played a very central role in the construction of national 
identity, and literary texts and writers have here a nationally iconic status 
that does not necessarily characterise other European contexts. You can 
have a literature, but in other countries, you’re not necessarily  entitled 
to independence for that, or perhaps you’re not even interested in  
 independence. (Recording, Workshop 2) 
The Polish scholar of language nationalism Tomasz Kamusella added that ‘most 
states and nations extant at present in the world do not have and do not aspire to 
Hames: Narrating Devolution20
spawn their own national literatures’. But in Sassi’s view, the fierce contestation 
of Scottish literature’s legitimacy and importance was itself strong evidence of its 
political significance: ‘The degree of denial and denigration suffered by Scottish 
literature in the twentieth-century is in fact directly proportional, I believe, to the 
perceived political power of an independent national literary canon’ (ibid.). 
In contrast, Alex Thomson offered a sceptical view of national literary history 
and its critical methods, so often employed to justify the canon (and discipline) in 
ways which tend to inhibit critical enquiry: 
Internally to the literary discipline there are several problems. [. . .]  
[Take] the circularity problem: the repeated allegorical mining of texts to 
explain the nation and be explained by the nation. There’s the selection bias 
problem: that our focus on political and cultural differentiation of those 
Scottish texts, [in order] to tell the Scottish story, leads to our neglect of the 
similarity between those texts and things which are happening elsewhere.  
[. . . ] There’s a worry that one of the things we’re doing is making thrawn,  
difficult, stubborn, problematic texts ‘safe’ for cultural use. In  particular 
there’s a risk that we try to redeem the negativity which is inherent to 
 modern art’s claim to have a critical stance against the world by assimilat-
ing it to a positive narrative, that narrative of cultural recovery and revival.  
[. . . ] This [style of] literary history has very much fed into some of those 
myths about what makes Scotland different: it is more social democratic, all 
its writers are outsiders, we don’t have any establishment writers, and so on. 
(Recording, Workshop 1) 
Methodological debate within Scottish literary studies seems likely to intensify as 
the charged ‘external’ political climate continues to highlight the field’s ‘structural 
nationalism’ vis-à-vis English literature (Connell 2003). In my view the opportunity 
to revisit the political self-constitution of ‘Scottish Literature’ as a subject should be 
welcomed, though others involved in the workshop might well disagree. 
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Re-problematising devolution 
Leading sociologist David McCrone notes ‘an influential strain of writing about the 
relationship between culture and politics’ in modern Scotland. 
Such culturalist accounts [. . .] have powerful appeal despite (or perhaps 
because of) their lack of systematic and rigorous evidence to back them. They 
are predispositions of considerable cultural power which set the frame for 
economic and political agendas. They may be wrong, in sociological terms, 
but they are powerfully wrong in setting the frame for debate. (McCrone 
2009, 54–56) 
Our task was not to gauge the rightness or wrongness of the culturalist narrative, but 
to investigate its influence and ramifications. We have already seen the varying pur-
chase gained by this paradigm in the fields of Scottish literature and political history, 
yet what seems impossible to reconcile in these differing accounts of devolution has 
its own cultural-historical interest, and deserves further exploration (not least from 
British perspectives). 
Looking back on the fictionalised version of the pro-devolution magazine Radical 
Scotland, Robertson’s central character (and in this scene, his alter ego) modestly 
notes that 
There were other, more visible, magazines with similar agendas that achieved 
much more in political terms, but Mike still feels a touch of pride when he 
looks at a copy of Root & Branch. And yet the argument that was conducted 
in its pages, as it was in the pages of those other journals, should not have 
been necessary. What was it again? It was, in the end, so convincingly won 
that it is hard to reconstruct it. (Robertson 2010, 537) 
Here precisely is the key problem: the difficulty of reconstructing the complexity, 
discord and non-integration of the arguments which produced the bland consensus 
taken for granted today. As political scientist Paul Cairney points out, the Scottish 
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public may view devolved government with a mixture of ‘ambivalence and disinter-
est’, but opinion polling shows that ‘anytime people identify failure in devolution, 
their preferred solution was more devolution’ (Recording, Workshop 2). The nonde-
script hegemony of devolution as a concept masks the complexity and contingency 
of its emergence as a policy – a factor often acknowledged within the culturalist 
paradigm, whatever its sociological limitations. We who inhabit the in-between – 
but already protracted – age of devolution should pay fuller attention to the debates 
which formed it, for they cast considerable light on the cultural and political dynam-
ics of the febrile present. 
What futures can we project for devolution today? In one sense, the political 
strategy became redundant in 2011, when it failed to prevent the open challenge 
to the legitimacy of the United Kingdom represented by the 2014 referendum. In 
another, the result of that referendum – 2 million votes against Scottish independence – 
was a ringing endorsement of devolution and proof both of its popularity and its 
durability as a ‘settled’ constitutional position. (This point was strongly made at our 
2015 workshop by legal scholar – and Unionist/Conservative campaigner – Adam 
Tomkins.) Having spectacularly failed to ‘kill nationalism stone-dead’, in the famous 
1990s prophecy of George Robertson, ever-further devolution is the maximalist mid-
dling way most popular with the Scottish public (see Curtice 2014), and serves as the 
basis for not one but two imminent strengthenings of the Scottish Parliament (the 
implementation of the Scotland Act 2012 and further new powers recommended by 
the Smith Commission in 2014). Simultaneously beefed-up and obsolete, devolution 
is being asked to mean most things to most people as never before. 
The need to recover (or construct) its historical meanings is accordingly urgent. 
Scotland has a very uncertain grasp of how it got to where it is going. The political 
slipperiness of devolution – both a deep-state stratagem to ‘dish the Nats’ through 
the management of national feeling, and a pathway to self-determination grounded 
in the recovery of cultural self-knowledge – generates a series of narrative problems 
for historians and citizens alike. Scholars are only beginning to grapple with the 
problem of narrativising devolution, even as the political process itself enters a kind 
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of muscular afterlife. After the ‘No’ vote in 2014, devolution is Scotland’s indefinite 
future, though a rounded view of its nature, genesis and significance – both cultural 
and political – is yet to emerge. 
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